Insiders’ outside/Outsiders’ inside : Rethinking the insider regulation
Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral gambling has become legitimate financial trade. This book explores the genealogy of the coexisting insider trading laws. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is misleading and that the regulation is best understood as a game rule aiming to stimulate financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the risks involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system itself rather than being naturally given. This places desire rather than rational needs as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game?
Source Type:Doctoral Dissertation
Keywords:SOCIAL SCIENCES; Business and economics; Business studies; Financial trade; speculation; insider trading; insider regulation; market professionals; law; game rule; gambling; economy; financial markets; desire; investment; risk; symmetric information; genealogy; deconstruction
Date of Publication:01/01/2006