On the indemonstrability of the principle of contradiction [electronic resource] / by Elisabeta Sarca.

by Sarca, Elisabeta.

Abstract (Summary)
ABSTRACT: In this thesis I examine three models of justification for the epistemic authority of the principle of contradiction. Aristotle has deemed the principle "that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect" the most certain and most prior of all principles, both in the order of nature and in the order of knowledge, and as such it is indemonstrable. The principle of contradiction is involved in any act of rational discourse, and to deny it would be to reduce ourselves to a vegetative state, being incapable of uttering anything with meaning. The way we reach the principle of contradiction is by intuitive grasping (epagoge) from the experience of the particulars, by recognizing the universals in the particulars encountered, and it is different from simple induction, which, in Mill's view, is the process through which we construct a general statement on the basis of a limited sample of observed particulars.
Bibliographical Information:


School:University of South Florida

School Location:USA - Florida

Source Type:Master's Thesis

Keywords:john stuart mill russell whitehead aristotle metaphysics logic dissertations academic usf philosophy masters


Date of Publication:01/01/2003

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