Respect as awareness of rational nature [electronic resource] : a modified intellectualist view of Kant's moral psychology /

by Ang, Ching-E Nobel.

Abstract (Summary)
ABSTRACT: Anyone who has undertaken even a cursory study of Kant's moral philosophy eventually has to confront the question: How can an abstract moral law move the imperfectly rational human will to moral action? It is generally agreed that Kant's notion of respect plays a central role in his account of moral motivation. While the central role of respect in Kantian moral motivation is uncontroversial, the further question of how such motivation by respect occurs is the source of debate. In their answers to this question, commentators are divided into two camps. Staying true to Kant's insistence that moral motivation is a purely rational process independent of any affective feelings, the intellectualists hold that apprehension of the moral law is by itself sufficient to motivate moral action. The affectivists agree with the intellectualists that moral motivation begins with the rational apprehension of the moral law.
Bibliographical Information:


School:University of Florida

School Location:USA - Florida

Source Type:Master's Thesis

Keywords:awareness kant moral nature psychology rational respect


Date of Publication:

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