Game Theoretic and Analytical Approaches to International Cooperation and Investment Problems
International cooperation and foreign investment issues are two important components of an international economy. The various aspects of research related to such international cooperation and foreign investment decisions are fraught with various complex factors. In this thesis, we consider two specific issues in the arena of international technological cooperation and foreign investments, by using established Operations Research techniques of game theory and multiple criteria decision making.
We first analyze regional technological cooperation mechanisms using classical game theory. A concept of regional technological cooperation is developed based on a cooperative game theoretic model, in which a plan of payoff distributions induces an agreement that is acceptable to each participant. Under certain conditions, the underlying game is shown to be convex, and hence to have a nonempty core with the Shapley value allocations belonging to the core. A compensation scheme is devised based on the Shapley value allocations, whereby participants who enjoy a greater payoff with respect to the technological cooperation compensate the participants who receive a relatively lesser payoff via cooperation. In this manner, regional technological cooperation can bring overall benefits to all the involved players in the game. Some insightful examples are provided to illustrate the methodological concept.
Next, we discuss a model for analyzing foreign direct investment opportunities and for evaluating related projects based on the International Investment Attracting Force Theory and the technology of fuzzy evaluation. This model is applied to assess the industrial investment projects that were proposed in the â â95 Chinaâs Tumen River Area International Investment and Business Forumâ funded by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Accordingly, the projects are classified into groups based on their potential to attract foreign investors. Furthermore, we simulate the actual forming process whereby projects are sequenced and selected for funding by foreign investors based on a sequential update of their effect on the local economy. The results provide a scientific basis for formulating related decisions and policy recommendations regarding the various proposed projects.