Corporate governance : theory and empirical evidence about the structures of the United States and Germany [electronic resource] /

by Schroeder, Ariane

Abstract (Summary)
In this paper, I review the topic of international corporate governance, starting with a description of the fundamental agency problem, the separation between ownership and control in the public corporation. Relying primarily on recent literature, I then present an overview of the various internal and external mechanisms that may provide potential solutions to this agency problem. The purpose is to show the eminent differences in national corporate governance structures in the use of these mechanisms. Therefore, I look at the system of the United States and the system of Germany, which reveal significant dissimilarities. For a deeper understanding of the ongoing changes in the field of corporate governance, I provide a detailed look at the German structure and then compare it with the US. Finally, I present current developments and possible future research areas.
Bibliographical Information:


School:The University of Georgia

School Location:USA - Georgia

Source Type:Master's Thesis



Date of Publication:

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