Cooperation between Competitors - Subcontracting and the influence of information, production and capacity on market structure and competition
Subcontracting and the influence of information, production and capacity on market structure and competition
In this study we analyze the competitive effects of cooperation between competitors in the form of subcontracting and the influence of information, production and capacity on market structure and competition. Three game-theoretic models are developed to evaluate firms's strategies and the competitive effects of information sharing and production sharing. They are motivated by and applied to a case study of the flat glass market in order to evaluate the restrictive policy of the European Commission. The models analyze the effects of subcontracting and exchange agreements on information sharing, capacity decisions and production decisions. Welfare effects with and without subcontracting are then being compared. In a horizontal subcontracting model first signalling via subcontracting and secondly the effects on product variety and capacity decisions are being analyzed. In an exchange agreement model cooperation between competitors with different efficiency levels is being studied. The results show that technology and market characteristics determine whether subcontracting between competitors increases or decreases welfare. The market is able to develop mechanisms such as signalling via subcontracting to overcome inefficiencies but competition policy should stay attentive while allowing for a rule-of-reason.
School:Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Source Type:Master's Thesis
Keywords:Informationsaustausch Signalling Signaling Querlieferung Subcontracting Kapazitätsentscheidungen Glasmarkt Flachglasmarkt competition policy European information sharing signalling signaling exchange agreement protection subcontracting capacity glass market flat QP 450 Austauschvereinbarung Produktaustausch
Date of Publication:11/16/1999